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II.—THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF LIFE.
I.
I T will be my endeavour in the following pages to demonstrate
the substantiality of life; to render evident the actual existence
of an identical, indivisible, perdurable, and self-sustaining sub-
stance, of which the transient phenomena, arising in conscious-
ness, are but inherent affectdona I wish, experientially, to
reinstate the underlying entity, dissipated by Berkeley and
Hume.
I have to set about this ambitious task in a rather humiliating
manner, namely, by first assuming everything which I eventually
hope to establish. I am, however, determined not to conceal
any part of my working-apparatus; and do, therefore, openly
presuppose as existing, and ready for action, the entire human
individuality with all its faculties, assisted too by every
available means of sense-extension.
This express postulation of the whole thing under discus-
sion will probably be considered a petitio prindpii of the most
glaring kind. But, without its full admission, I confess I cannot
proceed a single step towards my aim. My consolation is, that,
in starting with so bold and sweeping an advantage, I am only
strictly adhering to the common usage of all sciences. For no
philosopher will deny that, in the investigation of even the
most elementary physical or mental event, it is always the
feeling, thinking, and manipulating human being that con-
stitutes the sole realising agent Known, or unknown to the
observer, it is his own matured sensibility and sentience, that
actually furnish the colour and standard of any quality or value,
which he may have objectively ascertained.
Indeed, whether we are viewing present phenomena of
mechanical impact or chemical activity, or imagining primeval
geological evolutions, or forecasting developments of the future,
the great postulate, tacitly underlying all our observations and
speculations, is the pre-existence and unimpaired efficiency of
the complete human individual These things are so, were so,
will be so; but only when realised by beings like ourselves.
The nebular hypothesis, the atomic theory, the ultimate
chemical element are—as every philosopher is well aware—
hypothetical facts conceived in no other form and material than
that of specific human feelings, and they can, therefore, be true
only when we add : " Thus these legitimately surmised realities
would appear to spectators of our kind ".
Our organised lives form the broad, steady and indispensable
ontological basis of all impressions and ideas, of all actual con-
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nexions and fulfilments whatever. "We cannot outsoar our
nature. We cannot eliminate any part of ourselves. Our
whole individuality is present in every inquiry; and it is always
some peculiar group of our own aroused faculties that we are
contemplating in any kind of investigation.
I t is true that in the framing of our metaphysical schemes,
we have from time immemorial been striving to transcend the
sphere of our personal endowments. But it needs only sufficient
candour to become aware that in all these attempts we have
merely objectified, as groundwork of our cosmological construc-
tions, sometimes one and sometimes another set of our own
vital activities, and have then endeavoured to complete the
totality of existence by identifying with this particular portion of
ourselves all that was first left behind of our naturally indi-
visible being. Sometimes the whole, and sometimes only a part,
of our sensations are thus hypostatised as primordial elements
of the entire universe. At other times, it is the thinking or
reasoning energy that is made to account for everything. Then
the will Then some special emotional affection. Or, again,
a potentiality of all these subjective factors. Never anything
but detached faculties of our own being, and with no other
result than the transfiguration of the cosmos into a distortedly
projected semblance of our personal abilities.
Philosophical systems become very transparent when viewed
from this organic standpoint. As authority or custom may
happen to incline us, we play fast and loose with the various
potentialities of our organisation, extolling and depreciating
them in turns. A special importance and dignity, however,
necessarily attaches to that portion of our nature, which is
conceived as the causative source of the rest Therefrom the
whole conduct of life receives its characteristic tinge. For it
will not fail essentially to influence the bent of our strivings,
whether we attribute effective priority and controlling supremacy
to the senses or to the intellect, to the sensualised or to the in-
tellectualised appetites. A system of ethics can be scientifically
grounded only on a correct knowledge of vitality. "With what
uncertain feelings of propriety has humanity been wavering
between the extremes of organised capacities, now for a little
while getting into the wholesome and fruitful mean, and then
again consuming itself in wasteful lust, or stagnating in sterile
precepts!
Considering then, that the earnestness of our aims will always
be directed towards the fostering of what we believe to be the
embodiment of the truest potent reality, would it not be wise,
once for all, ungrudgingly to acknowledge the position actually
occupied in nature by the complete and indivisible human or-
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ganisation ? For, is not this individual and monadic totality, in
fact, everywhere the really substantiating agent, the creative
power whose subtle and intricate modes of normal reaction
constitute the whole universe of experience called nature ?
And is not at all times the value of any other thing rigorously
determined in every respect by the actual efficiency of the
appreciating agent, by his realising qualifications then and
there?
The individual human organisation forms, indeed, the actual
incorporation and potential medium of all fulfilment When-
ever this truth becomes adequately established and understood,
it will impart an incalculable impetus to existence, will bring
designedly about, "whereof our nerves are scant," "more life
and fuller ". For, to recognise how in our transitory frame, by
means immeasurably transcending the reach of personal volition,
there has become embodied the life-worthiness of the illimitable
past, is to receive the wealth of our being as a sacred trust, and
to own a binding mission to labour for a progressive future.
But it is easy to profess a faith, hard to give it a solid
foundation. The philosophical arbitrariness of thus dogmatically
constituting ourselves the pre-endowed and realising centre of
the world, lies, on the one hand, in the difficulty of accounting
under this assumption for our own origin and development, on
the other hand, in the difficulty of reaching, from such a focal
position of mere subjective consistency, any kind of reality
outside our own mind.
It must, however, be remembered that these two per-
plexities have irrepressibly confronted systematic thought, from
whatever side it may have attempted to assimilate nature.
The former difficulty has generally been allayed by traditional
beliefs or hap-hazard conjectures. The latter has formed the
main puzzle and theme of philosophy ever since Pannenides
and Zeno first directed the attention of thinkers to the strange
incongruity obtaining between the ideally completed world
permanently resting in mind, and the fragmentary world
transiently and incoherently figured by the senses.
Meditative reflection necessarily leads to the discovery of a
disposition, of ideas ever tending towards all-embracing unity
and repose. Direct observation, on the contrary, is beset by a
rush of phenomena ever moving through inexhaustible kaleido-
scopic constellations.
In the world of thought-conception, the fundamental relation
between ideas appears to be one of graduated co-inherence, of
involuted union; any detached notion forming an integral part
of a pre-existing and wider totality. In the world of sense-
perception the fundamental relation between phenomena seems
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to be one of more or less orderly sequence and change, a regu-
lated passage from one state into another.
In the realm of ideal or logical subsistence, things are, even
through discursive reasoning, more and more adequately recog-
nised to be what they are for all times. In the realm of
physical or phenomenal display, existences are perceived con-
tinually to cease to be what they were, and to become something
entirely different
To which of the two orders then belongs genuine reality ?
To the ideal, to the physical, or to both ? And how are these
so disparate, and yet so intimately interblending worlds to be
reconciled, to be comprehended as co-operant parts of one and
the same totality ?
This is the great dilemma of the immutable and the flowing
order that has perplexed philosophers for more than 2000 years,
and we also, in spite of so many baffled attempts, are still per-
severing in the endeavour to gain access to the secret. From
"ideal realism," i.e., the projection into transindividual and
autonomous existence of the logical order, to "empirical realism,"
i.e., the projection into transindividual and autonomous existence
of the physical order, every imaginable combination has been
essayed. But, however contradictory to each other these sundry
philosophical constructions may be, they have one and all
received their cue in direct continuity from the Eleatic anti-
nomy. This one idealistic aperpi has undeniably formed the
fortile source of all our systems. The atomic systems, the
sceptical systems, the Socratic systems of antiquity avowedly
take their rise from this same unquenchable fountain-head of
doubt. And it would be unpardonable in us who owe to
ancient Greece almost our entire culture, not generously to
acknowledge also the philosophical inheritance which it has
bequeathed to us, and which it seems to me we have not yet
succeeded in very essentially improving.
Is not the problem of the relation and intercommuni-
cation of the thinking and the extended substance, of the
intelligible and the sensible world, which has formed the
subject-matter of philosophy since Descartes, merely a revival
of essentially the same puzzle concerning reality ? Even the
Critical Philosophy, with its copious appliances and minute
distinctions, lias it not after all only elaborately fortified the
Eleatic position by deepening the gulf between the foreign
influences underlying the chaos of appenrances arising within
our sensibility, and the transcendental subsistence of their
conceptual transfigurations ? Kant's great effort to reconcile
through reason the intelligible and the sensible world has
proved a failure like all former attempts. In the system of
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critical idealism, the conceptual order mentally fashioned and
qualified resides as infallible actuality, as ideal and undeviating
object, in a general superindividual consciousness. But where,
on the other hand, do we find sustained the reality of the
affecting powers, of the things outside consciousness? "What
can it avail passionately to denounce as mystical and fantastic
previous forms of idealism, and peremptorily to decree by dint
of reason the existence and efficiency of an outside world,
when there is no imaginable way left open by which external
influences can at all specifically qualify the passive and empty
forms of sensibility—pure ideal time and space ? And, besides,
if the influences that are admitted somehow nevertheless to
affect our sensibility are actually things-in-themselves, and if our
intelligible Ego also belongs to that order; then, as all spon-
taneous and synthetical activity emanates from the intelligible
Ego, is it not likely that under such conditions reason would
indeed recognise the transcendent nature of things-in-themselves,
would reconstruct from the incoherent data given to sensibility,
by force of its own transcendently derived faculties, the
eternal aspect of the intelligible world ?
The transcendent oneness of subject and object, the identity
of thought and being involving the existence and supreme
reality of an absolute substance—the very doctrine enunciated
by the Eleatic sages—certainly constitutes one of the only two
philosophical positions that can at all be consistently occupied.
Transcendentalism in any of its forms necessarily leads to this
consummation.
But, before indulging in extreme prospective fulfilments we
have first of all scientifically to secure a path that will not lead
us astray in our search after true existence.
Starting then, as we anyhow must, from our own individu-
ality, we find that, within us, by dint of the secret powers of
our nature, there arises a series of phenomena, a complex phan-
tasmagoria of things and events, in every respect the creation of
those intrinsic powers. Nevertheless, in certain aspects, these
mental phenomena seem most obviously to represent existences
and occurrences, having subsistence in a region not occupied and
governed by our own being. The problem, the supreme problem
of the theory of knowledge, is either to prove that the reality of
the world, which appears to subsist outside consciousness, is
altogether an illusion; or, accurately, to demonstrate the mode
of inter-dependence and inter-communication, unifying not only
the two seemingly heterogeneous spheres of mind itself, but uni-
fying, moreover, the powers inherent in mind with the forces
extrinsically influencing the same.
It is a plain and incontestable truth, that all we know, and
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all we can know, of things is simply what may become revealed
of them vicariously and sympathetically as affections of our own
being. Our own sensibility is the foundation of all our supposed
knowledge of an external world, and our consciousness can be
composed of nothing but our own feelings. I t is therefore quite
clear that conscious sensations can only result from the action of
powers already belonging to ourselves, already forming part of
our constituted individuality. Thus the whole universe, of
which we become aware, resolves itself into a congeries of sub-
jectively sustained and combined ideal states. I t forms a crea-
tion in mind, mysteriously accomplished and upheld. And,
however fleeting in all its time-manifestations, it nevertheless •
symbolises some enduring presence. What then can be the true
nature of the comprising and sustaining something, fragmen-
tarily revealed in the desultory flashes of conscious life 1
We cannot wonder at the suasion of logical conceptions, at the
preponderance and supreme reality so often and so emphatically
assigned to the ideal world, when we consider that all qualities
predicated of any subject whatever are always recollected as an
incorporated part of our mental being, and are, moreover, on due
consideration, found to form, from the very beginning, a subjec-
tive group of affections, momentarily singled out from the bound-
less possessions of ideality, and somehow projected and consoli-
dated into the semblance of outside subsistence. Intrinsically
and ideally are shaped, qualified, discriminated, and unified all
phenomena, all influences that affect the senses, that outwardly
or inwardly modify sensibility.
I t cannot be denied that, when thus realised in its inclusive
or ratiocinative aspect, the universe, established in mind, opens
to the reflecting subject an insight into an organic enchainment
and essential communion of all phenomenal affections. Deep
inwardly beyond the fretted screen of temporal occurrences are
truly recognised the eternal ideas that sustain the scattered and
perishable manifold. And it would be strange, indeed, if the
fervent soul, exulting in this inalienable wealth of widest
thought and emotion, were not to feel the limitations of its own
individuality melting into infinity; if its whole being, amplified
and completed, did not seem in blissful consummation to be
merging into the One-and-AlL
But, on the other side, in their perceptual or phenomenal aspect,
the contents of mind do not reveal themselves as co-inhering
in one and the same indivisible and identical substratum of
thought On the contrary, thus viewed, ideas seem merely to
constitute more or less collective remembrances of previous ex-
perience. They are, in fact, recognised as only representing
groups of concrete sensations, held together by similarities ob-
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 2, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The Substantiality of Life. 327
tabling between them, and they are found to be associated with
each other by lawB that originate in the phenomenal order, i.e.,
in the coexistence and sequence of experienced affections. Our
consciousness then discloses itself, as composed of nothing but
the orderly appearance and reappearance of sensations and
perceptions, inscrutably arising and incomprehensibly vanishing.
We have, no doubt, to admit a centripetal as well as a cen-
trifugal view of nature. How are these two opposite orders
connected with each other ?
It is true, whatever way we may be looking, sound reasoning
ends in shutting us up irresistibly and most thoroughly within
the magic circle of our solitary mental subject Nothing from
outside can in its own essence and likeness penetrate this total
isolation, or coerce to foreign modes of action the intrinsic pro-
clivities of so private and specific an autonomy. But, even
then, without the least direct reference to external influences,
what a contrast between the two poles, or rather between the
central and the peripheral capacities of our mental being I
What divergent revelations of ideal reality are inevitably forced
upon us by a mere change in the adjustment of our mental
vision! By fixing our attention exclusively on the conceptual
or central order we consistently become transcendentalists. I
do not mean transcendentalists of the compromising or critical
kind, but genuine transcendentalists, beholding the transpheno-
menal essence of things, the everlasting glory of archetypal
being. By restricting our view to the perceptual or peripheral
order we inextricably become sensational empiriciste, receiving
all our grounding knowledge in the form of sense-impressions,
and being compelled, therefore, to adopt nominalistic idealism
in which everything is phenomenal and evanescent.
In this idealistic dilemma, one question is uppermost with
our practical sense: "In which direction may we eventually
hope to burst through the secluding spell which wholly en-
compasses our individual microcosm ?" Will it be through
its centrifugal or through its centripetal activity that our mind
will succeed in rationally establishing vital and fertile relations
with the macrocosm of Otherness, with the great universe of
non-coinciding actualities? We desire, designedly and unre-
servedly to open our being either to the central or to the peri-
pheral influx—whichever way the creative tide may flood our
existence with higher life.
However legitimately our reason may seem to imprison us
within the narrow confines of pure individual idealism, our
strongest instincts carry with them the conviction of outside
powers influencing us all round. Our whole active nature, our
emotional and our volitional propensities revolt against the dreamy
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 2, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
328 The Substantiality of Life.
and illusionary self-seclusion imposed upon us t y ratiocination.
Irresistibly impelled, we rush out of self to grasp realities beyond.
Our most urgent needs, and our most exalted desires, alike leap
the bounds of self-sufficiency. Not only our immediate appetites
crave appeasement through the appropriation of externalities,
but our tenderest sympathies hasten to bestow on other lives the
most precious and ideal worth of our own being, and our loftiest
pleasures make us zealous to mould foreign existences into the
perfect shape of ideal purpose.
Nevertheless, in thus attributing actuality to relations that
common-sense unhesitatingly believes to subsist between our-
selves and an outeide nature, we are evidently altogether
transgressing our power of rationally dealing with the data of
consciousness. For, how can our reason, a pure mental faculty,
under any solicitation whatever, be rendered competent to
transplant subjectively inherent ideas into a foreign region of
altruistic subsistence, whereby they become elevated to the
transcendent dignity of self-consistent realities ? This, however,
is exactly the licence we have been indulging in, when we
allowed our instinctive or conscious promptings to overreach the
spell-bound circle of subjective idealism. For this purpose we
had to assume as existent, on the one side, a bodily organisation
or executive apparatus governed by our mind, but by no means
coinciding with the same in its reality ; on the other side, we had
to postulate independent external existences in efficient inter-
action with ourselves. All these realistic feats were, no doubt,
most fluently accomplished by us. But we shall have to admit
that their philosophical justification remains to the present day
the great unrealised desideratum of the theory of knowledge.
Theoretically, we still find ourselves locked up within a sphere
of dreamlike apparitions, which we call our mind, and now the
puzzle is how, conformably to reason, to win our way back again,
not only to the things beyond our skin, but also to the special
vital appurtenances contained within that bodily envelope.
The fact is, we are psychologically debarred from the access
to any pathway leading to outside existences. Our mind cannot
go out of itself to meet other things and to blend with them,
nor is it anywhere open to the entry of foreign beings.
We have once for all to put up with this fundamental truth.
It can never be subverted. But examining the aspect of ideal
nature yielded on the one side by the logical, on the other side
by the phenomenal propensities of our mind, we discover in
both these orders certain definite voids created by unsatisfied
relational implications, which implications are distinctly con-
nected with the positive properties of mental occurrences as such.
Here it is above all the evident orderliness, manifesting itself in
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 2, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The Substantiality of Life. 329
the combination of ideas that seems to imply something ex-
traneous to mind, coercing single mental states into coherent
and consistent connexions. First, -there is thus suggested some
substratum supporting and perpetuating for reproduction the
successive mental states. And then, as we do not find anything
in mind itself to account for the coalescing of its disparate
moments into specific configurations following each other in
regulated sequence, we are induced to infer an influence of some
kind controlling this grouping operation. Moreover, the ideal
order thus compelled seems to subserve purposes transcending
purely ideal capacities. Somehow, namely, we have ourselves
the power of imposing permanent changes on the coalesced
appearances or perceptions, which changes evince themselves
thereafter as forming part of the mind-compelling influences.
For instance, I feel coerced to realise the definite and complex
mental state which I call a sheet of paper. By the exertion of
certain activities within my power I now change the appearance
of this sheet of paper so that it consists of ten pieces instead of
only one. Henceforth, this transformation does constitute part
of the mind-compelling order. I shall be forced to perceive ten
pieces whether I wish it or not.
It is true I become aware of all this solely through the
medium of subjective feelings, but some hypothesis has to be
framed to account for the fact of compulsion, which fact cannot
be included in the operations performed by the mind's own
spontaneity. We give expression to this experience of outside
compulsion by assuming causative agents as instigators of our
compelled mental states. We know positively only the latter,
but infer therefrom the existence and efficiency of the former.
Physical forces or energies are nothing but such hypostatised or
substantiated causes of compelled mental states, and the science
of externalities consists in the construction of an hypothesis of
energies that will adequately explain the facts and relations of
the peculiar order of phenomena, apparently derivable from
direct sense-stimulation.
It will, however, be best frankly and distinctly to avow that
we do not possess within our purely mental constitution any
rational premisses from which could be deduced the seat and
nature of the compelling influences. The supposition of powers
outside our individual minds will ever form the standing de-
sideratum of belief and knowledge, without which not a single
scientific or practical step can be taken, and which has on each
special occasion to be made good by prompt hypothetical
assumption. All activities of our nature are moulded on this
transindividual supposition, and receive their cue from i t But,
as regards the special conceptual framing of the hypothesis, the
2 2
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sole guarantee of its correctness can only be afforded by the
adequacy of the conception to account for all facts and relations
of the so-called outside world.
Thus it happens that the following question has played a
great part in philosophy, and stall continues to arise: Is our
mental being centrally or peripherically coerced? Does the
compelling influence work centrifugally or centripetally? From
intellectual emotion to thought and sense, or from sense to
thought and intellectual emotion ? It is of supreme practical
importance that this query should be decisively answered.
Which of the two chief assumptions can best explain the
scheme of nature: the transcendental or the experiential hypo-
thesis ; the central or the peripheral influx ?
IL
Leaving out of sight the relation of sensations to the surmised
extraneous source of their excitation, and taking the immediate
and elementary affections of the mind as simply given, the main
problem of philosophy, since Locke, has been that of the
synthesis of sensations and perceptions.
Sensations, as such, are experienced singly and unconnectedly
yet in consciousness they are found coalesced with a number of
other remembered sensations into distinct percepts. A percept
is an integrated assemblage of present feelings, an individual-
ised set of impressions and ideas ; yet, discrete as these mental
objects seem to be, they are found conjoined with each other so
as to form, not only a coherent totality of configuration, but
also an endless train of regulated sequence. Whence this
correlative union and orderly procession? In the concrete
appearances themselves there is evidently nothing discernible
that could in any way account for their definite disposition and
connexion. Therefore, somewhere in the hidden recesses of the
manifesting structure, there must reside a power, which coerces
the unconsolidated and successive manifold of sense into a well-
regulated system of conscious appearances. The question i s :
In what manner, and in which of the provinces of the feeling,
thinking and willing mind is this synthetic power exerted ?
"No connexions among distinct existences (impressions or
perceptions) are ever discoverable by human understanding.
We only fed a connexion," says Hume.
" As a connexion does not impress our senses, but has to be
made by ourselves, it does not belong to the receptivity of the
subject, but to the spontaneity of the understanding, of which it
is a function a priori" says Kant
The antagonism of our two leading philosophies is tersely
2 2
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expressed in these most contrary opinions regarding mental
synthesis. According to Hume, our judgments about the
conjunction of phenomena are based on an association of impres-
sions and ideas established, and at last rendered indissoluble by
custom. The inference, i.e., the mental transition from a present
impression to the idea of its cause or effect, is an action, not
executed by reason, not accomplished by an original energy of
the understanding, but wholly impelled by experience. Because
two definite impressions have often been experienced in im-
mediate sequence, therefore the presence of one of the impres-
sions irresistibly calls forth the remembered idea of the other
impression, and this automatic association is under such circum-
stances furthermore accompanied by a peculiar sentiment, which
assures us of the reality, or objective validity of the connexion,
making it appropriate and safe for us to act upon the ideal
suggestion.
The strength of this view lies in the demonstration of the
fact, that inferences concerning the actual connexions of-
phenomena are derived from experience, and that they take
place in the sensible sphere of the mind, take place there with
an energy independent of the promptings of abstract thought
and deliberate volition. Direct judgments about matter-of-fact,
genuine synthetical judgments, which declare that because a
certain something is present another certain something is also
present, or because a certain something has just happened,
another certain something has also happened or is about to
happen,—such immediate conclusions concerning reality are
altogether experiential in their origin, and occur under the sway
of a present impression as automatic and sense-derived mental
manifestations. I t has become more and more certain, since
this novel discovery of a whole world of unreasoned conclusions,
that judging-operations of this kind, unconsciously performed
within the domain of perception, constitute indeed the very
groundwork of our natural relations and practical doings. Thus
far we are undoubtedly conscious automata, and we cannot
help suspecting, that some kind of organic constitution must be
at the bottom of this fundamental process of organic inference,
or mental reflex-action.
The chief shortcomings of Hume's Association-hypothesis
consist: (1) in the omission of an explanation why the ideas
so necessarily connected with their suggesting impressions are
themselves moreover truly realisable in nature as actual sensa-
tions—why the heat, suggested merely as idea by the flame, can
also then and there be made good as an impression; (2) in the
complete ignoring of any synthetical medium, and of any
synthetising power.
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The former shortcoming is intentional. Hume deliberately re-
fused to account for the origin of impressions, and had conse-
quently to avoid any allusion to the correspondence of the causally
suggested ideas with their realising sensations. This is, however,
just the point in causation most difficult to explain, and upon
which the relation essentially turns. We are most anxious to
learn how this consummation of matter-of-fact inference takes
place; how the right sensation or impression comes to fit in at
the right moment; how, for instance, the actual heat of the
flame happens to be there to make good its suggested idea.
This is a problem for the bare insight into which the 18th
century was not yet ripe. It can be scientifically solved only
with the help of the hypothesis of connatural evolution, a
hypothesis which we shall have occasion to consider when its
bearings on causation have to be discussed.
The other shortcoming of Hume's philosophy, or rather its crea-
tion of an absolute void beyond consciousness, is a necessary con-
sequence of its premisses. Starting with nothing but single and
elementary impressions, and their fainter copies, the ideas, it
was impossible for experience, with only such clear-cut consti-
tuent pieces, to put together anything but a mosaic mind, a
mind composed merely of clusters of elements. Of course,
this aggregational compounding of our conscious existence was
not quite ingenuously feasible. Memory and Association,
though only manifest in their concrete results, had nevertheless
to be indirectly recognised as forming part of the mental
mechanism. Custom could not operate on nothing. In order
to establish its connexions it had to work on the same secret
resources that originally and spontaneously furnished the copies
of impressions, and it had to work also on the hidden spring of
ideal transition or inference. But, notwithstanding this surrep-
titious drawing on Memory and Eelativeness, we have to admit
that, in consciousness itself, the reproductions and associations
are found accomplished without our becoming in the least aware
of the means which have brought about these complex and
flowing results. Here then, we have a clear exhibition of
unconscious powers producing conscious effects, and we may
once more parenthetically remark that it lies near to suspect
organic foundations for the automatic processes evincing them-
selves as memory and association.
With Kant, mental synthesis is a subjective operation,
intrinsically initiated, directed and executed. According to
him, the coherency and order of phenomena are wholly due to
original faculties of the mind. I t is true, he peremptorily
maintains that these a priori faculties are exerted only on
material impressed on our sensibility. But he allows nothing
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actual in the sense-material to affect, in any way, its subsequent
synthesis. From somewhere, empirical stuff is kaleidoacopically
received in the passive forms of sensibility, making up there a
contiguous, but utterly unobjectified manifold. Thereupon
synthesis begins. First the raw-material is congruously sorted
and loosely connected. Then it is objectively and conceptually
cemented together for good. All this is done by a certain
spontaneous activity, emanating from our innermost being, the
identical Ego, and differing toto gmere from sensibility. This
identical Ego, to which all synthetical processes refer, and
without which the confused sense-material would ever remain
unshaped, uncombined, unrelated and unconceived, is not itself
phenomenally manifest, but belongs to the intelligible world.
Its inalienable powers, however, evince themselves as functions
a priori in the various modes of conjunction, through which the
phenomenal world receives its universally valid coherence and
unity.
The strength of this view lies in the recognition of a unitary
system of innate synthetical powers, through wliich the particu-
larly and severally experienced sense-affections receive their
general relational significance.
The chief failings of the view are: (1) its non-appreciation of
the actual correspondence, uninterruptedly subsisting between
the ideally connected order, and its realisable sense-affirmations:
(2) its non-acquaintance, with the conspicuous sphere of auto-
matic sense-judgments or percepts.
Thus, the Aggregation-theory of mental composition fails to
recognise a primordial medium, in which connexions are actually
established, and in which they then potentially subsist. The
Transcendental theory of phenomenal coherence mistakes the
conception and naming of combining processes for the actual
powers that in reality unconsciously accomplish the conceived
synthetical results.
Evidently, there lies somewhere, within the compass of
nature, a fixed range of unremitting and controlling activity,
from whose solid industry the orderly manifold of consciousness
emerges ready-made, and to whose steadfast toil and safe-keeping
the whole constancy and communion of the phenomenal world
rests entrusted. It is plain, however, that the facts of individual
consciousness do not themselves disclose the quickening source
whence they spring. We have here nothing but a succession
of distinct conscious states, nothing but a mere outflow of ever
so many single feelings and thoughts. Something, nevertheless,
there needs must be beyond this bare sequence of mental
components, something harbouring them all, and persisting
inexhaustibly one and the same. The countless changing and
23
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334 The Substantiality of Life.
passing states of consciousness obviously issue from some
unperishing matrix, and there subsists some binding, living
constitution, in which synthetical results, once achieved, there-
after safely and retrievably abide.
But where are we to seek for such a substantial entity ?
Students of philosophy, who have earnestly pondered over
the great theme of the synthesis of mental constituente, will
have found every aspect of the question deepen into a still more
fundamental problem.
Sfnations and thoughts, the sole agents through which
existences are revealed to us, are themselves ephemeral effluences,
arising momentarily and as suddenly vanishing. How then can
anything more enduring than a single sensation or a single
thought become part of our consciousness ? How can that,
which is permanent in nature, be in any way manifested by that
which is only a perishing semblance ?
To gain an approach to this chief enigma of philosophy, we
will first explore it in its least complicated presentation. The
most immediate and elementary fact of consciousness is un-
doubtedly that which is called a sensation or impression. So
many aerial beats, for instance, strike the tympanum in a second,
and give rise to a corresponding multiplicity of vital beats in
the auditory tract. It is certain that the sensory impulse
received and vitally responded to, consists of numerically dis-
crete units of action, of which, moreover, each ceases to be, as
soon as its successor becomes present; now, notwithstanding
this serial ingress /A non-adhesive and momentarily perishing
shocks, the sensory result appears in consciousness as a synthe-
tised, homogeneous, and enduring whole, as one single coherent
impression.
I venture to say that this simple statement contains as much
unsolved mystery, as may well be condensed into any problem.
Indeed, we need only find the true explanation of this one
elementary mental occurrence, and with it would be opened to
us the most profound secret of mind; for it is obvious that the
very life-spring of memory and personal identity is involved in
its solution. We should then know, how the unity of our being
is maintained amidst its multitudinous affections, and how these
relational affections are substantially preserved, in spite of their
phenomenal or conscious evanescence.
Time, and everything in it, reveals itself as made up of
consecutive moments, each preceding instant lapsing into
nothingness at the birth of the next. To our conception time
seems ever fleeting away as irrecoverable, past, ever sliding out
of sight into the illimitable vacancy of that which is no more,
and sinking along with it all its weight of conscious wealth.
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Sorrows and joys, sensations, thoughts and actions, no sooner
are they realised than they are pushed out of the way again, to
be followed by others, in new succession. Yesterday has run
out never more to return, and all that is thus passed, is gone
by for good.
What magic power is it then, that, nevertheless, contrives to
save the complete and intricate fabric of our mind from the
nihilistic perils of these its timely wanings, that even succeeds
in turning its irrecoverable losses to permanent gain ?
Here we find ourselves inevitably brought face to face with
this most solemn question concerning the nature of our inner-
most being. Shall we continue to evade with easy and empty
phrases the stern meaning and relentless admonitions implied
in its actual manifestations ? Shall we conceal from ourselves
the true mission of our lives, which is not to swoon back into
the pristine bliss of all-comprehensive being, but laboriously
to uplift higher still the now precious, pain-wrought inheritance
that actually is ours ?
Not that the wondrous sphere of ideality is at all to be
denied. There exists in all truth as a firm reality, and not
merely as an illusive fancy the veritably ideal. But surely its
world-embracing picturings are not woven of hyperworldly
preconcerted thought, but of thought cosmically, slowly, solidly
concerted from the first responsive quivering of blind life to its
loftiest visions of sympathy and beauty. Thought is the bloom,
the sublimation of life, not its fount and origin. And life itself
does not scatter and darken the luminousness of transcendent
thinking, but irradiates with revealing brightness the concen-
trated influences of dark and thoughtless things.
The two great cosmological conceptions, which are now
struggling against each other for supremacy in human conscious-
ness involve inevitably as ultimate result the decision : Whether
life be indeed a deplorable aberration from the original fulness
of thought-steeped being; or whether it be rather a desirable
unfolding of more and more intense and ample world-conscious-
ness.
The question here immediately at issue i s : How from the
conscious outflow of particular feelings and thoughts can the
nature of their common source be inferred ?
We find a very remarkable concurrence of the opinions of our
two standard philosophers, with regard to this recondite problem
of personal identity or individual substantiality. They both
emphatically declare the impossibility of forming a philosophical
conception of i t
Hume without much ado roundly asserts : " We have no idea
of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular
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qualities, nor have we a notion of mind, distinct from the
particular perceptions." This is plain and just reasoning for
one who looks upon perceptions as " distinct and independent
existences," and for whom mind, therefore, can mean only an
aggregate of such perceptions, or indeed, not even that much.
But Kant, to whom, on the contrary, perceptions (in Hume's
sense of the term) are nothing but indistinct and dependent
appearances, and to whom, above all, the unity of consciousness
is an undoubted and supreme fact, how is it that, with such
diametrically opposite views, he nevertheless fully corroborates
the experiential doctrine, that we know only mental states and
that mind as a substance is not cognisable ?
Kant also finds, as the result of his profound introspective
research, that " when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or
other". When I eliminate all attributes, that which I deem
substantial remains unknown. Our reason is discursive., and
thinks only in predicates, consequently we can never through
reason reach the ultimate subject of all these predicates. The
true Ego is only a sentiment accompanying all conceptions,
but it can never become a conception itself. The Ego which we
know is only empirical, is altogether made up of particulars.
In time, in the " inner sense," nothing enduring is found, nothing,
therefore, which could at all justify us in substantiating a think-
ing entity. The intelligible, identical Ego, which constitutes
the unity of consciousness, must ever remain unrecognised, for
it can never itself become an appearance, and it is only appear-
ances that can be grasped with our understanding. Of course,
it very readily occurs that the unity, apprehended in the syn-
thesis of thoughts, is taken for a unity actually perceived, actually
appearing. This, however, is a mistake, which may be called
the " surreption of the hypostatised consciousness," a mistake
which is at the bottom of all rational psychology, of all psycho-
logy which professes to derive its doctrines from data not experi-
entiaL
This is the deliberate confession of the most scrupulous and
also one of the most penetrating of philosophers; one who in
his ripe age—after a life of preparative meditation—had set
himself to establish transcendentalism on an irrefragable basis.
First, he believed a few montlis would suffice for the task, for
he was already in possession of the entire groundwork of his
system. But eleven long years of concentrated contemplation
elapsed before he had accomplished the work to his own satis-
faction. He then felt bound most impressively to warn all
thinkers that no legitimate way can be discovered by which we
are allowed understandingly to pierce beyond what is given in
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experience, and that in experience only the synthetised manifold
of sense is found. " Noumenorum non datur scientia".
What then is to be done ? Is there, indeed, no method left by
•which we may, nevertheless, secure some cognisable foundation
on which efficiently to ground the phenomenal display of the
perishable manifold ? Are we, in all reality, irremediably con-
demned to remain for ever utterly ignorant concerning that
which gives unity and consistency to our being, and therewith
unity and consistency also to the rest of the perceived and con-
ceived universe ?
It behoves us most carefully to consider this critical position,
and to follow therein indications of natural truth with no less
conscientious awe than Kant himself.
Hume and Kant are right. Self-consciousness does not afford
us any knowledge of personal identity. Introspection does not
teach us in what manner the manifold of experience is inhering
in a substantial Ego; does not make clear how it is that all pre-
dicates refer to an ultimate subject; how it happens that time,
carrying away our feelings and thoughts, does nevertheless not
rob us of our mental possessions; how, on the contrary, these
become the firmer rooted the more lavishly we dispose of them.
To escape from hopeless scepticism, it will be appropriate to
remember here the fundamental hypothesis of all knowledge,
the hypothesis connaturally preconcerted, and everywhere
desiderated in experience, therefore also unhesitatingly adopted
by instinctive and practical life. This hypothesis consists in
the hypostatising of definite causes or forces outside conscious-
ness in correspondence with the definite impressions and per-
ceptions inside consciousness. All science of existences over
and above the appearance of our own mental states is based
on this one supposition. Consequently the question now before
us may, from this point of view, be thus expressed: Can the
substance in which mental affections inhere, become an object,
an appearance to an observing mind? Can it be viewed, by
dint of conscious states, as an outside existence 1 If so, then
a science of it can properly be framed in the same manner as
all other sciences are framed. In other words : The unknown
confluence of powers, which constitutes a person or individual,
can it affect our sensibility in such a manner as may enable us
through definitely occurring and varying modes of this our
sensibility to recognise—just as we recognise any other thing
or event—the secret giving substantiality to a person or indi-
vidual thus observed ?
It is undeniable that the something, to whose being we are
ascribing individuality, impresses most intricately, delicately
and specifically our senses, appears within our sensibility a
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 2, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
338 The Substantiality of Life.
complete and complex unity of conformations and features,
being thus perceived by us with surpassing distinctiveness and
precision. A strange perversity of thought has hitherto marred
the transcendent glory of this inscrutable mystery of sympa-
thetic revelation. By affixing opprobrious names to it, calling
it " perishable and corruptible body," or " senseless and inert
matter," prejudice has succeeded in vilifying that which in the
whole range of our experience is pre-eminently psychical: an
abiding entity fixedly mirrored in mind on the sensitive foil of
its transitory feelings.
This phenomenal presence, or bodily appearance, attests
indeed a most miraculous display of constancy, affinity and
intelligibility. In the depths of my own being I find stead-
fastly subsisting the full symbol of another existence, whose
proper constitution and intrinsic essence ever evades my reach.
But lo! in spite of all this exteriorising and excluding other-
ness, we are not foreign to each other in our innermost natures ;
for I, who am now so definitely and intimately affected by your
actuality, do possess on my part the secret virtue of likewise
impressing your being with a similar fulness of sympathetic
recognition, becoming to it an understood and reliable presence.
When we turn from the contemplation of that part of our
personality which we find generalised from the experience of
conscious states as such, and which we call our mind, to the
contemplation of an outside personality as revealed to us through
the medium of our senses, we are struck with the infinitely
diversified and elaborate contrivances which here evidently
concur in the constitution of such a personal or individual unit.
Though we recognise this only symbolically in modes of our own
consciousness, still we may rest assured that a corresponding
intricacy of constitution belongs irrelatively to the nature of the
personality affecting us. Whatever personality- may be in its
own self, independently of our viewing it, it must necessarily be
sometliiug at least as complex as the organisation by which its
existence attests itself in our minds. Therefore, whatever this
perceived organisation discloses to us, we may with perfect con-
fidence symbolically attribute to personality as such, for it
necessarily corresponds to some trait in its affecting or stimulat-
ing power.
It is this exquisitely attuned connatural parallelism of
stimulated and stimulating states which renders science or
knowledge of any kind possible. The appearances in space and
time are specifically stimulated affections. Let the regulating
rhythm in the stimulations be subverted, and all knowledge is
at an end. We have then only delirious exhibitions continuing
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so long as the intrinsic capacity of the organic structure is not
exhausted.
Through the study of organisation we discover that conscious-
ness accompanies only the functions of the highest, most
coneentrative, and therefore, most central parts of the organic
individual; that, however, the remotest details of its constitution
all contribute towards this structurally centralised aud function-
ally centralising consummation of its personal unity. And we
find, moreover, that this intrinsic consummation of organic
forces is destined to become at last effective in extrinsic results,
through the instrumentality of the volitional or executive part
of personality. In truth, we discover that we have a wonder-
fully more complicated and extensive consistence than we are
immediately conscious of; but that fortunately this deficiency
in the general subjective feeling of ourselves can be remedied
by objective study.
The special information which we are now desirous to obtain,
is: Whether, among the symbolic occurrences of organisation,
there can be detected any clue to the secret of personal identity
or individual substantiality, a secret which, as all thinkers know,
will not yield to purely introspective research
We learn, as an indubitable fact of organisation, that every
functioning portion of an organism accomplishes its task only by
losing some integrant part of its substance, by parting with
some constituent elements of its molecular constitution. It is
clear that this mutilation would infallibly incapacitate it for a
renewed functional effort equal to the first if some provision
were not made for the complete restitution of its functioning
substance A sensory nerve, for instance, after a single respon-
sive beat could not be in a condition adequately to respond
to a second beat, if its functionally deteriorated substance had
not been meanwhile promptly restored to its full integrity. If
all the auditory pulses which go to make up a certain homo-
geneous sound, were not received and transmitted with equal
responsive energy, the quality of the resulting sound could not
possibly appear homogeneous. If, on placing one's finger upon
something which awakens in the mind the sensation of specific
touch, the functioning substance of the affected nerves suffered
disintegration without adequate reintegration, then it is cer-
tain that no two moments in the sensation would be alike.
Identity of function necessarily presupposes identity of
functioning substance. It is an unquestionable fact that a
substance in functioning undergoes disintegration. Conse-
quently, it is equally unquestionable that identity, manifested
in two consecutive moments of any kind of.organic function,
must be due to the reconstitution of the functioning substance.
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What is thus true of the many relationally functioning parts
of an organism, must be true of the organism as a whole. If
inequalities in the constitution of the entire organic unit, arising
from excess of function of one or other of ite organs were
not duly equalised through correlative reconstitution, then
identity of such an organic unit would be out of the question.
The central changes wrought by the irruption of continually
varying combinations of peripherically stimulated function would
soon completely transform the structure of the central substance,
in case the organic unit had not the power of renovating itself
as a whole. What would become of the vaunted stability of the
world of thought, if the random intrusion of phenomenal- dis-
turbances could permanently upset the perennial, the change-
conquering equilibrium of the central substance, or rather of the
complete monadic individual in whose unity and indiscerptibility
the soundness of our mind and body safely reposes 1
We feel, let us say, thoroughly tired out. The agitating
appearances of the bright day have seemingly obliterated our
previous store of confirmed knowledge. We search in vain with-
in our exhausted mind for what we used readily to find there.
Our will is impotent to summon up its legions of vassal thoughts.
Our inner eye strays over emptiness. Let us then no longer
wilfully resist, but fully and trustdly yield ourselves up to nature.
Softly and securely she closes all inlets of rousing impressions,
withdraws the hum and stir of foreign presences, steeps our
whole being in darkness and oblivion. And now, from out the
unconscious depths of vital constructiveness our existence is
made whole again, our lost possessions reinstated. We are,
once more, ourselves, organically reconstituted, awakening to
renewed activity, prescient bearers of all the guiding Past.
The philosophical import of these organic facts cannot be
mistaken. Our personality is identical amidst its multifarious
modes of functional yielding, only because its unity and in-
tegrity is adequately maintained by means of reconstitution.
And it remains identical only in so far as such rehabilitation to
complete structural identity actually takes place. This perfect
state of substantial identity is however, fortunately, only ap-
proximately, and never fully attained. Adequately realised, it
would at once put an end to all development, would produce an
undeviating snmeness of vital states, without individual growth,
and without generical evolution. There can be distinctly traced,
within the scope of individual life, a progressive cycle of anti-
identical modifications. The natural growth of a being involves
a constant deviation from its personal identity. It leads through
pre-established stnges of evolution to generical maturity, a con-
dition of existence, in which the growing person has reached a
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higher, a transindividual identity with the culminating status of
its kind. This identity of adult beings of the same species is
again only approximate. If in individual growth it regularly
happens that personal identity is made to diverge from unifor-
mity through generical influences, it also happens that the
individual has in its turn the power of effecting changes in the
identity of the genus. Simultaneously, with growth, there occur
further deviations from personal identity, caused by the acquisi-
tion of individual experience. Excellences of any kind, thus
acquired, over and above those already organically embodied in
the constitution of the genus, go, through transmission, to
heighten the generical standard.
The identity, which we find manifested in vitality, is kept
in this manner everywhere flowing and progressive, but it is an
essential identity nevertheless, an identity so indispensable to
life, that upon its strict conservation depends wholly, not only
the consistency of our own personality, but also the appearance
and order of the entire universe, as known to us.
Personal identity is grounded in an order of efficiency un-
thinkably more unfathomable than any thought of ours, than
any kind of intelligibly discernible potentiality; unthinkably
more substantial than anything found in conceptional revela-
tion. It is perpetual experience, immemorial memory incorpo-
rated, systematised, and ever organically resuscitated.
For those, who can find no commensurable transition from
their subjective feelings of mental mobility and subtlety to
their objective feelings of organic stability and solidity, it may
prove serviceable to give heed to the intimate nature of
organisation. Not through the firmness of its constituent par-
ticles, but only through its composition as a whole and through
the specific mode of its activity, does the living substance
possess any degree of consistency and constancy. The sundry
successive sets of constituent particles, which one after the
other are forced in and out the specific cycle of vitality, are
playing but a very ephemeral part in the phenomena of life.
The peculiar arrangement and activity, which determine in all
respects the nature of the living individual, are themselves
occurrences intangible enough as actual presences. But the
specific arrangement with ita accompanying activity is during
its perpetuation, moreover, quite newly and incipiently caught
up from other pre-existing specific configurations and activities
by most rudimentary collocations of particles; and these mere
beginnings of organic new formations are ultimately developed
into the full likeness of their genealogical prototypes, solely by
dint of the transmitted compository influence. Thus, in endless
train, the bare peculiarity of arrangement is being transferred
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as such, from one individual to another; an imperishing posses-
sion, very obviously secured by something altogether trans-
cending the identity of material constituents, on which—
according to some—all genuine permanency is based. The
successive material embodiments are completely broken up and
scattered to the winds, yet the ' form' indelibly endures. One
and the same persisting presence is ever visibly underlying its
many changing and perishing presentations, is moulding with
perennial potency all accruing stuff into its exact type of organic
conformation, compelling it, for a while, to subserve only its own
unitary purposes.
All this means, the recognition, indeed, of a hyperin-
dividual actuality, much of the same order as Platonic ideas
professed to be; but the conception is experientially, not
transcendentally derived. The Platonic idea was the reminis-
cence of an archetypal order only intelligibly existent, and
connected with our sensible world of ectypal manifoldness
merely by help of a supernaturally pre-established harmony.
The organic idea is the symbolical representation in human
conception of the actually embodied synthesis of a sensible
manifold, realised in thought by help of a naturally established
harmony between the perceiving subject and the perceived
object. The former idea was the expression of an ideal estrange-
ment, the latter of an actual concordance.
The conception of our own individual identity forms part of
the organic idea, and receives, as we have seen, its explanation
from organic occurrences.
The substantiality of our being, as vaguely hypostatised by
introspection, is actually the same organic fact of reconstitution
under a somewhat different aspect. Vital occurrences of any
kind, sensory functions naturally included, are in all truth varying
modifications of one and the same identical and indivisible
organic unit We have here a display of most manifold appear-
ances and events, a continual outflow of most diversified specific
energies. Yet the manifesting entity indiscerptibly endures.
It lasts undiminished and undivided amidst all its changing and
perishing modes. It lavishly spends itself without suffering any
substantial loss.
This fact, evident but unexplained, has constituted the great
paradox in philosophical interpretation, the inevitable stumbling-
block of all systems. The insoluble mystery of substantiality,
the " final inexplicability " of all schools, and with us of that of
Kant as well as that of Hume, of that of Hamilton as well as
that of Mill, has consisted in the impossibility of conceiving
how anything can remain actually and indivisibly the same under
constant intrinsic changes and timely expropriations. Or, as
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John Mill puts it, " How something which has ceased, or is not
yet in existence, can still be in a manner present".
Duration, not as the sum total, but as the support of changes,
has thus remained a philosophical perplexity, beyond the reach
of sober thought It was distinctly felt that time with its con-
tents cannot possibly be a mere rope of sand, yet it was not
understood from what perdurable and unrelinquishing influence
it receives unifying consistency and relativity.
This ancient mystery is scientifically cleared by the recognition
of the reconstitutive power of the organic unit as an indiscerp-
tible totality. This assertion may be thus confidently made,
because it can be witnessed without a chance of error how by
redintegration the living substance preserves its identity amidst
continual functional changes.
What moi* can be affirmed of any substance, not thus expon-
entially given but otherwise imagined, than that amidst its vary-
ing affections it constitutes an identical, indivisible, perdurable,
and self-sustaining focus of energy. The deepest philosophical
discussions have always turned on these essential attributes of
substantiality; but the performance of putting together a true
substance out of these well-conceived properties was carried on
outside any real medium; in fact, in absolute vacuity. For
" indivisible simplicity " is an utterly annihilating attribute. I t
completely nullifies any sort of reality. I t represents nothing
but an inert mathematical point.
Homogeneous extension of any kind is, indeed, infinitely di-
visible ; but this means, in reality, that no part of it—be it ever
so minute—is qualitatively distinguishable from the whole.
Take, on the other hand, as initial totality a chemical molecule
consisting of heterogeneous elements, and all the reasoning ap-
plicable to homogeneous extension becomes at once invalid.
Here, evidently, it is only the definite combination which forms
the whole, constituting it a truly indivisible unit, of which no
part is qualitatively identified with its totality. Any process of
division would instantaneously annul the indiscerptible integrity,
by dint of which it forms the definite whole given in reality; a
whole consisting altogether in the specifically interdependent
relations of heterogeneous elements.
It is precisely in this sense that an organism is essentially an
indivisible totality. The living substance, even in its most ele-
mentary forms, constitutes a flowing chemical unit, of which all
parts are interdependent and heterogeneous. A careful survey
of the chemical cycle that sustains the living substance proves
this plainly.1 Observers have been hitherto misled, in the inter-
1
 Readers who have no opportunity of observing monera for themselves,
but who would like visually to realise the vital conditions above indicated,
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pretation of the nature of the protoplasmic individual, chiefly by
the fact that any severed portion retains its vitality, continuing
to perform the main functions of life. They concluded therefrom
that the living substance must be made up of qualitatively equal
parts; a conclusion which seemed also in perfect harmony with
facts familiar through the study of inorganic nature. Neverthe-
less, the misinterpretation here under consideration is very trans-
parent. If I cut a piece off an entire moner, the cut-off piece,
as well as the moner itself, will reconstitute the full integrity of
the type represented by the complete individual. This occurs
certaiidy not because both parts of the divided individual con-
sisted of equal molecules; but, on the contrary, because they
formed fragments of a mutilated unit, which by complemental
•affinity or organic repair succeeded in reintegrating themselves.
This very evident state of things becomes quite unmistakable
when the two portions of a divided organism are strikingly hetero-
geneous, even to the naked eye, the one being, for instance, the
head, the other the tail-end of the individual. If now—as it
actually occurs in certain worms and other inferior animals—the
head forms a new tail, and the tail a new head, it is altogether
patent that the completion of the organic totality is here the
controlling influence, and that it is the chemical heterogeneity,
not the chemical homogeneity, of the severed parts which makes
the complemental reconstitution possible.
In short, the living substance or organic individual is indivis-
ible, because it constitutes a specific chemical unit, persistingly
maintained by means of reintegration. •
It is perdurable, because amidst a continual vortex of changes,
it succeeds in preserving its integrity by restoration.
And, lastly, it is self-sustaining, because it has residing
within its own self affinitive powers which, during functional
and other destructive changes, constitute it a chemical radical
with definite energies of complemental saturation.
Under this readily verifiable organic point of view, some of
the oldest and most unwieldy philosophical paradoxes receive
an easy and undubious solution. In the operations of vitality
and organisation we find reconciled conceptions, which other-
wise appeared utterly incompatible. It becomes evident, be-
yond suspicion, how identity and perdurability can coincide in
one and the same being with change and decay; nay how such
a being can even draw progressive power of unity from the
perpetual flow of the perishing manifold.
will find very fair illustrations of various monera, appended to a paper con-
tributed by the present writer to the London St. Tlwmadt Hospital Report*,
1879.
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And now that we have established substantiality on a scien-
tific basis, and have gained an insight into its organisation and
working, it will be interesting to contemplate for a moment the
difference presented by the spurious substantialities figuring in
philosophical systems, when compared with the genuine sub-
stantiality here erplained.
In the effort to account for knowledge, it was found indis-
pensable to presuppose as foundation something identically
enduring; for, even the simplest proposition presupposes identity
and stability of some part of its contents. Through generali-
sation of this logical relation, substance came to officiate in
philosophy as something which supports varying modifications
without itself ever varying.
After what has been here stated, it can be seen at a glance,
how hopelessly unintelligible such a conception of substantiality
must ever remain. In order, logically, to insure the surmised
unchangeableness of substance, metaphysicians had to postulate
its simplicity, and at last also its indivisibility. Anything
complex is liable to change. Everything is complex which
is in any way composed, for it consists of constituent elements.
Everything is complex which is extended, for it can be divided
into manifold parts. Therefore only the uncomposed and the
indivisible can be perdurable and incorruptibla
So much seemed necessarily implied in the conception of
substantiality, and now the puzzle was intelligibly to unify the
diverse, manifestly known attributes, with a simple and unex-
tended substratum which remained ever concealed. I t was
clear—even to early thinkers—that the attributes which are
many in number and heterogeneous *in kind cannot possibly
form constituent parts of a substance which is thought of as
simple and indivisible. Consequently the attributes had to be
conceived as affections of the substance. But how ? At times
the conception of substantiality appeared to fit best the endur-
ing existence which seems to.support all external changes. The
• state of material subsistence implied a substantial substratum
of some sort. There was here, clearly, something unperishing,
underlying the perishing modifications. But it was hard to
understand how composite and divisible things could in any
way inhere in something whose unchangeable persistence in-
volved uncompromising simplicity and indivisibilty. Besides
the substantiality supporting material attributes was not itself
a perceptible existence, and nad therefore to be conceived as a
purely intelligible entity; an entity which could only be
realised in thought, and never could become a sensible mani-
festation. Some philosophers, remaining, nevertheless, faithful
to the objective view, endeavoured now to construct the universe-
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346 The Substantiality of Life.
out of the interaction of simple and indivisible particles, which
particles had, at last, however consistently to dwindle away into
unex tended centres, manifesting their existence merely through
irradiation of energy. To others it appeared that thought, as
such, possessed the closest affinity to substantial being. The
perdurable something, manifesting modifications, and never
revealing itself to sense, might possibly be thought itself, all-
comprehensive thought, adequately disclosing, as changing moods
of its own, the apparent manifold. A certain simplicity and
indivisibility belongs seemingly to the nature of thought, and
generally speaking it does not lose its existence by manifesting
its affections. It is still there, undiminished, to repeat its
performances over and over again. But if thought is actually.
the substance, or—more correctly—the veritable substantial
thing-in-itself, what becomes of it when no thinking is going
on ? Where does thought retire to in the intervals of its
manifestations ? It had to be admitted, on close inspection,
that the substantiality of thought, for all its promise, discovers
iteelf, likewise, as interrupted, incoherent and ephemeral. In
fact, it never presents itself as a persistent whole, but always
only as a succession of moments, perishing within the diffracting
and dissolving medium of time. Therefore, thought, as known
to us, cannot be that all-sustaining essence of being, meta-
physically postulated. Moreover, in proportion as thought, in
its thinking moments, widens in comprehension, it loses its
hold on reality. When fully stretched, so as to become co-
extensive with being in general, it represents not the totality of
being, supporting the entire wealth of known affections, but
only an empty shadow of being, deprived of all qualities.
The ultimate, all-comprising substratum must then be some-
thing infinitely more profound than thought, something, of which
thought itself is merely one among many divers modifications.
It is this utterly saturated substance, in its undisturbed simpli-
city and indivisibility, which is conceived as the self-sufficient
One-and-All, the Absolute.
It necessarily follows therefrom, that any perturbation in the
self-poised repose of this complete totality can only lower its
maximum state of perfection. Modifications or affections of
any kind can only become manifest through restriction of its
absolute completeness. " Determinatio est negatio," says
Spinoza rightly, echoing therein the teachings of the Cabbala,
and these again the teachings of Neoplatonism. The position
of anything determinate, within the uniform excellence of the
all-embracing existence, must needs be a privation, a degrada-
tion, a negation of the perfection of that existence.
This, undoubtedly, is the genuine logical outcome of the
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spurious notion of substantiality which governs transcendental-
ism. The metaphysics and ethics of that great school of
philosophy will have sooner or later unswervingly to bend to
this leading conception. Transcendental optimism and person-
alism are inconsistencies, which will have to give way to uncom-
promising pessimism and pantheism. To such a cosmological
conception pur human lives can signify ethically nothing but a
struggle for complete reabsorption, for the final state of absolute
quietude somehow—by some unaccountable guilt—recklessly
forfeited. This view of emotional pacification through re-iden-
tification with the All-Being, long familiar to nations of the
East, is becoming a wide-spread creed also in Europe.
The real contest, now pending, is not between intervening
modes of thought, but between the very extremes. Either
genuine Transcendentalism or genuine Naturalism. The fate of
future generations depends on the decision.
nx
Our sciences have been hitherto exclusively governed by the
Aggregation-hypothesis. All bodies are conceived as clusters of
elements, not only when the units entering into their structure
are considered homogeneous, but also when they are known to
be heterogeneous. The constitution of bodily textures is
mentally represented as a grouping of elements into more and
more complex configurations. These constituent elements are
believed to persist, as such, within the compound; indeed, to
make up the same by their mere juxtaposition, and the summa-
tion of their respective energies. Forces, infringing on material
products of this kind, are thought immediately and intrinsically
to affect only the relative position of the constituent elements,
and thereby mediately also the general equilibrium of their
snndry energies. Permanent modifications of material com-
pounds acted upon in this manner are considered to be effected
by permanent displacement of their elementary particles.
Diminution of mass is believed to occur only and simply through
subtraction of constituent elements; increase of mass through
addition of such. In every case the elements themselves are
taken to be the veritable bearers of the specific properties and
energies, of which the compound represents the balanced sum
total.
In studying primitive forms of protoplasm, as I have already
explained in this journal (MIND XIX., XX), I was led to frame
a very different conception of the intimate constitution of living
structure. In this instance, at least, the compound as such, i.e.,
the balanced totality of the product, is very evidently the
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controlling power; a unitary power, to which all elementary
energies are completely subservient The constituent elements,
that enter into the composition, receive their relative position
and influence from the specific constitution of the whole. They
form integrant parts of an indiscerptible unit, not constituent
parts of a divisible aggregate. Infringing forces do not merely
displace elements, but break up the integrity of • the whole.
There occurs not simply mechanical shifting, but chemical
ruption. And .the disturbed equilibrium is not restored by
mechanical readjustment of parts; but is effected by comple-
mental reconstitution of the chemical totality. Permanent modifi-
cations of such a unit cannot possibly take place through
permanent displacement of its elements. In violent encroach-
ment, either the substantial unit ceases altogether to be, or it
succeeds in restoring its previous integrity. Permanent modifi-
cations have to come about through a change in the mutual
affinities of the elements, the modified status of saturation,
evinced by the compound as a whole, becoming then the
expression and index of the realised modification. When in the
course of growth or development elements are added to the
whole, they are not merely interposed between other elements,
but go to effect a chemical change in the entire unit. There
results an essentially different being by means of a modified
chemistry, not only an enlarged bulk by means of a numerical
increase of constituent parts.
The modes of energy displayed by the organic individual are
not due to the expenditure of force newly brought to it by
accruing complemental material or food, but are altogether due
to the unlocking of forces contained in the saturated affinities
of the chemical radical, which in any condition of functional
disintegration remains the conservative and restorative core of
the living substance. This permanent, self-sustaining core of
life is the embodiment of all evolutional results, and its vital
manifestations are the expression of its own most specific and
rigorously preserved endowments. It is this spontaneous
self-preservation of the living substance amidst superficial
changes, keeping intact the accumulated acquisition of ages,
that composes the perdurable substratum for the display of
temporal occurrences.
The organic individual appears to us as a chemical unit
constantly shattered by external influences at its exposed and
chemically cumulating regions ; but as constantly renovated by
intrinsic affinities through incorporation of complemental
material. The surface of a highly developed organism presents
most diversely differentiated points of contact to most diversely
stimulating influences. These inlets of specific modifications all
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converge towards one common centre. And to whatever depth
the disturbing influences may happen to penetrate, they are
always met by the spontaneously reconstituting energy of the
organism as a whole.
Thus the innermost fact of organisation, or rather the culmi-
nating event of intrinsic organic reproductions, coincides with the
most profound psychological occurrence. The spontaneous
reconstitution to perfect integrity of the living organic unit, in
spite of multifarious temporary encroachments and derange-
ments, accounts for the supreme stability of pre-organised
experience, for the stability of what with human predilection we
are wont to call the conceptual order. And it explains also the
contrast which is found to obtain between the self-evolving
persistency of that order, and the evanescence of special pheno-
menal displays, i.e., of the casually stimulated sensory configura-
tions. I t is the intrinsically and spontaneously renovated
totality of our being, which is enduringly opposed as reacting
medium to the successive inrush of varying sensory activities.
The logical order depends on ideal and volitional detachment
of previously centralised and recognised affections from the all-
comprehending unity of apperception. The phenomenal order
depends, on the contrary, on the compulsory determination of
specific affections, potentially inhering in more peripheral regions
of the mental structure. Here, however, " determination " is by
no means " negation," but very positive confirmation. It is
truly confirmation of organic life and being, because the relations
between the stimulated parts and the stimulating influences are
naturally preconcerted. It essentially belongs to the nature of
organic existence to be thus specifically roused by external
powers.
Conscious states are clearly ephemeral effluences of an enduring
being poised—far beyond conceptual comprehension—in the
exquisitely exact and subtle balance of what symbolically reveals
itself to us as vital substantiality.
So far as the resplendent gifts of vitality are concerned,
we may implicitly rely on organic perpetuation; only, we
must ever bear in mind that this perpetuation has to
take place through the instrumentality of individuals. It,
therefore, devolves upon each of us most scrupulously to concern
himself, that during his period of agency the transmitted
endowments of the living substance do not suffer deterioration.
And, moreover, it is incumbent on us all to be striving with
ambitious solicitude tliat our own mite, which by personal
exertion we are able to contribute to life's abounding store, may
not prove unworthy of lasting incorporation.
EDMO>~D MONTGOMERY.
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